Author: Tara Crisp
Simultaneous operations (SIMOPS) are a routine part of oil and gas work — multiple crews, overlapping scopes and shared environments, often under schedule pressure. The risk isn't SIMOPS itself; it's the added interfaces. When roles blur, communication breaks down or conditions shift mid-job, exposures can escalate quickly.
Stop Work Authority as a real-time control
More than a principle, Stop Work Authority (SWA) is a practical control in high-consequence environments. It operationalizes the expectation that "everyone is responsible for safety" by enabling any worker to pause work when something doesn't look or feel right before it becomes an incident.
In offshore environments, this is formalized through Safety and Environmental Management System (SEMS) requirements, which call for procedures to stop work immediately in the presence of imminent risk and to do so without fear of reprisal. The same intent should be embedded in strong SIMOPS design:
- Minimize or eliminate SIMOPS where feasible
- Identify SIMOPS risks and controls before work begins
- Operate under a single permit authority
- Conduct coordination points (interface meetings/toolbox talks) so crews understand cross-impacts
When SWA matters most
SWA tends to succeed (or fail) in predictable moments across the job lifecycle:
Before work begins
If SWA isn't explicitly built into the job plan and reinforced in the JSA or toolbox talk, crews often default to production priorities, especially when multiple contractors share the same footprint.
During execution
SWA becomes critical when conditions change: sequencing shifts, new hazards emerge or scopes begin to interfere. Common triggers include access and egress constraints, hot work near line opening or overhead work affecting another crew.
After a stop-work event
Leadership response shapes future behavior. If the first stop-work is met with resistance, reporting declines. If it's handled with clarity, speed and visible support, SWA becomes a trusted control rather than a policy statement.
Cultural risk: retaliation and perceived consequences
Programs can unintentionally undermine SWA through real or perceived retaliation. OSHA's whistleblower framework notes that retaliation includes any action that would deter a reasonable worker from raising a safety concern, with protections under Section 11(c).
Across pads, plants and offshore environments, workers need to trust that stopping work will not impact their reputation, compensation or future opportunities. Without that trust, SWA is unlikely to be used when it matters most.
What "good" looks like in practice
Effective SWA programs are visible, consistent and used. In our experience, leading organizations:
- Define clear stop and resume expectations
- Reinforce SWA through training and pre-job planning
- Integrate SWA into SIMOPS coordination and permitting
- Treat interventions as learning opportunities, not disruptions
How Gallagher can help
At Gallagher, we view SWA as a leading indicator of operational discipline, particularly in complex SIMOPS with multiple contractors. We help organizations pressure-test:
- SWA procedures and field usability
- Contract language and cross-contractor expectations
- SIMOPS controls that enable safe, timely stop-work decisions
A well-designed SWA process helps ensure work proceeds safely, even as conditions evolve.